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I. Introduction
For the period of August 1, 2020 through July 31, 2021, there were
important changes in the landscape of oil and gas law in Ohio. The Ohio
Legislature passed a bill concerning Natural Gas and Propane Services and
multiple courts decided a number of cases interpreting the Marketable Title
Act, Dormant Mineral Act, and saltwater injection well permits; however,
no significant changes were made through administrative law by the Ohio
Department of Natural Resources-Division of Oil and Gas Resources
Management. Consequently, the most noteworthy changes in Ohio oil and
gas law between August 1, 2020 and July 31, 2021 have occurred in the
courts.
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II. Statutory Law
A. Passed Legislation
1. Natural Gas and Propane Service
House Bill 201 (sponsored by Rep. Jason Stephens R-Kitts Hill) was
presented to the House on March 10, 2021, passed by the Senate on June
24, 2021, and was signed by Governor Mike DeWine on July 1, 2021.
Beginning on September 30, 2021, this bill will enact sections 4933.40,
4933.41, and 4933.42 of the Ohio Revised Code. Said sections guarantee
access to natural gas and propane by any supplier that is certified to provide
services in that location, thus guaranteeing that every person has a right to
obtain any available distribution service or competitive retail natural gas
service from gas suppliers or propane service. 1 Upon its passage, Ohio
became the 19th state that has either passed or will have passed what is
known as a natural gas “preemption” bill into law. This law will bar
political subdivisions, such as a “township, county, or municipal
corporation,” from enacting laws that would limit, prevent, or prohibit a
consumer within its boundaries from using distribution services, retail
natural gas service, or propane. Furthermore, the bill creates a competitive
market in retail natural gas services from competitive retail natural gas
service suppliers.
B. Proposed Bills
1. Fossil Fuel and Gas Pipelines
Ohio House Bill 192 (the “Bill) was introduced on March 9, 2021 to
enact section 4933.40 of the Revised Code which will prohibit local
governments such as counties, townships, and municipal corporations from
prohibiting or limiting energy generation from fossil fuels and the
construction or use of a pipeline to transport oil or gas.2
Proponents for this Bill advocate for protecting a person’s choice to use
natural gas in their homes and address the possibility of increased prices for
Ohio residents by local governments enacting potential prohibitions of
natural gas.
This Bill was referred to the Committee of Energy and Natural
Resources on March 10, 2021. No vote is scheduled at this time.
1. OH LEGIS 33 (2021), 2021 Ohio Laws File 33 (Sub. H.B. 201).
2. 2021 Ohio House Bill No. 192, Ohio One Hundred Thirty-Fourth General Assembly
- 2021-2022 Session.
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2. Brine as a Commodity
Ohio House Bill 282 and Ohio Senate Bill 171 (the “Bills”) both propose
to enact section 1509.228 of the Revised Code to establish, under certain
conditions and requirements, brine as a commodity, which would allow the
sale of brine from oil and gas operations and exempt it from requirements
otherwise applicable to brine. 3 Under the proposed Bills, in certain
instances, brine from conventional wells can be permitted for use as a
deicer and a dust suppressant on roads by municipalities and government
agencies. Upon the passage of either of these Bills, oil and gas produced
seawater, used to melt ice on roads, could become more prevalent within
the State.
Ohio House Bill 282 was introduced to the House May 3, 2021 and
referred to the Committee of Energy and Natural Resources May 4, 2021.
Ohio Senate Bill 171 was introduced to the Senate April 27, 2021 and
referred to the Committee of Agriculture and Natural Resources April 28,
2021. No vote is scheduled at this time.
3. Utilization for Oil and Gas Operations
Ohio House Bill 152 (the “Bill”) proposes to amend section 1509.28 of
the Revised Code to revise the law governing unit operation and to enact
changes pertaining to how oil and gas leasing is managed when a
landowner refuses to lease their lands. 4 Under current Ohio law, unitization
provides a process for an applicant to advance with its oil and gas
operations if a small minority of mineral owners in a proposed unit refuse
to lease their minerals. An oil and gas operator can seek an order from the
Ohio Department of Natural Resources to mandate landowners into oil and
gas well units. Upon an operator’s application approval, landowners
without a lease have their oil and gas rights placed into the unit. Such
changes to section 1509.28 will include, but are not limited to:
1) Creating a minimum charge against nonconsenting landowners
in the amount of 300%.

3. 2021 Ohio House Bill No. 282, Ohio One Hundred Thirty-Fourth General Assembly
- 2021-2022 Session; 2021 Ohio Senate Bill No. 171, Ohio One Hundred Thirty-Fourth
General Assembly - 2021-2022 Session
4. 2021 Ohio House Bill No. 152, Ohio One Hundred Thirty-Fourth General Assembly
- 2021-2022 Session
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2) Within 30 days of the Chief of the division of oil and gas
resources management’s unitization order, the unleased mineral
owner must choose one of the following options:
o Enter a lease with the operator for the unleased acreage in
the unit, with a 12.5% net royalty and a lease bonus in the
amount of 75% of market value of lease bonus rate for the
acreage within the proposed unit times the amount of the
landowner’s acreage in the unit.
o Consent to including the acreage in the unit and follow all
terms of the proposed operating agreement.
o Fail to consent and then be subject to the 300% charge on
drilling and equipping costs.
o Failure to elect within the time frame results in a lease at a
1/8th net royalty.
3) This law further adds protections in the trade secret, research,
development, or commercial information of the operator secret,
allowing the Chief permission to not disclose such information
to the public, including public hearings.
4) It also allows for hearings on applications to be conducted
remotely.
5) Requires hearings on unitization applications to be held within
30 to 60 days of an application for unitization.
6) Requires the issuance of the unit order within 30 days of the
hearing unless it has been denied within that 30 days.
This Bill was introduced to the House February 23, 2021 and referred to
the Committee of Energy and Natural Resources February 24, 2021. No
vote is scheduled at this time.
III. Administrative Law
There were not any notable administrative law developments in Ohio
during the time period of August 1, 2019 to July 31, 2020.
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IV. Common Law
A. Ohio Supreme Court
1. Marketable Title Act to extinguish mineral interests
In West v. Bode,5 December 2, 2020, the Ohio Supreme Court issued its
decision regarding whether the Ohio Marketable Title Act (“MTA”) can
still operate independent of, and without an irreconcilable conflict of, the
Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (“DMA”), which was expressly enacted for the
purpose of creating a method of determining when a severed mineral
interest is abandoned to extinguish ownership of previously severed oil and
gas interests. The Court determined that either the Marketable Title Act or
the Dormant Mineral Act may be used to reunite a severed mineral interest
with the surface property subject to that interest.
The surface owners claimed that oil and gas interests were extinguished
by operation of the MTA.6 The heirs of royalty interest holders argued that
the DMA’s more specific provisions exclusively govern the parties’ claims
to the oil and gas royalty interests.
The MTA, enacted in 1961, has the purpose to simplify title of land
ownership by automatically by extinguishing interests and claims that
existed prior to the effective date of the “Root of Title.” 7 The DMA,
enacted in 1989 and amended in 2006, operates by providing a surface
owner an evidentiary device that they may use in a quiet-title action to clear
title by reuniting the mineral and surface ownership through abandonment. 8
Although they have similar purposes and provide the same results, the court
determined that they operate differently from one another. The MTA
applies automatically through operation of law to extinguish old claims and
interests 40 years after the “Root-of-Title.” The DMA instead will only
operate as an “evidentiary device” that the surface own can use on their
own with a shorter, 20-year “look-back” period and alternative “saving
events” that focus on the owner’s intent. 9 While the Court noted that the
MTA and the DMA were certainly different—observing that the MTA has
a longer lookback period and is self-executing and that the DMA has
different saving events and notice requirements—it held that those
5. West v. Bode, 165 N.E.3d 298 (Ohio 2020), reconsideration denied, 159 N.E.3d
1168 (Ohio 2020)
6. West, 165 N.E.3d at 295.
7. Id. at 297.
8. Id. at 304.
9. Id. at 301-302.
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differences were reasonable and reconcilable. The Court further observed
that they shared a central purpose of “simplifying and facilitating land title
transactions by allowing persons to rely on a record chain of title” and that
a mineral interest holder could comply with both statutory schemes to avoid
losing any mineral interest. The Court stated that it was reasonable to
believe that the legislature intended for the DMA to provide surface owners
an additional mechanism to accomplish reunification of dormant mineral
interests with the surface estate in order to promote the use of natural
resources when those interests could not be extinguished under the MTA.
2. Recitals and references to prior reservations under the MTA
In Erickson v. Morrison,10 March 16, 2021, the Ohio Supreme Court
expanded upon the interpretation of the Ohio Marketable Title Act’s
(“MTA”) R.C. 5301.49(A) exception that provides that the marketable
record title is taken subject to interests inherent in the record chain of title,
“provided that a general reference . . . to . . . interests created prior to the
root of title shall not be sufficient to preserve them, unless specific
identification be made therein of a recorded title transaction which creates
such . . . interest.” In its opinion, the court determined whether recitals or
references to a prior reservation are specific enough to satisfy the MTA’s
requirement to preserve a mineral owner’s interest and that it not be a
“general reference.”11 The court concluded that references to prior
reservations do satisfy the MTA.
In Erickson, the severed oil and gas interests were first reserved in 1926
by the Logans, who subsequently sold the interests to the Ogles specifically
referring to the 1926 transaction. The surface interest were transferred
multiple times, all with the original “excepting and reserving” language
pertaining to the oil and gas rights. In 2017, the Ogles heirs filed an action
against the surface owners, the Morrisons, to have their ownership of the
Interest preserved. 12 The Court held that “The Marketable Title Act does
not require that a reservation set forth the name of the person holding the
interest in order to be specific and preserve the interest.”13 Furthermore, a
recital in later deeds that contain reservation language nearly identical to
the original severance language was specific enough to point a reviewer
back to the original deed and, as such, sufficient to preserve the interest
10. Erickson v. Morrison, 2021-Ohio-746, reconsideration denied, 168 N.E.3d 526
(Ohio 2021)
11. Erickson, 2021-Ohio-746 at ¶ 31.
12. Id. at ¶ 8.
13. Id. at ¶ 4.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

400

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

under the MTA even if the holder or heirs are not recorded in the
reservation.
3. Notice Requirements and Reasonable Due Diligence of the
Marketable Title Act
In Gerrity v. Chervenak,14 December 17th, 2020, The Ohio Supreme
Court concluded that the circumstances of each individual case will control
how a surface owner must research in finding mineral interest holders
before acting by publishing notice through publication under the Ohio
Dormant Mineral Act (“DMA”). The Court rejected adopting a bright line
rule for title searches (Leaving it up to the legislature if at all).
In Gerrity, Timothy Gerrity sought a judgment quieting title and
declaring him the owner of the mineral estate underlying a 108-acre
property in Guernsey County. John Chervenak—trustee of the Chervenak
Family Trust, owner of the surface estate—claimed that the mineral estate
belonged to the trust because it had been deemed abandoned under the
DMA. Mr. Gerrity, conversely, claimed that Mr. Chervenak’s use of the
DMA was ineffective because he failed to comply with the Act’s notice
requirements. The Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas awarded
summary judgment to Mr. Chervenak, and the Fifth District Court of
Appeals affirmed that decision.
The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Mr. Chervenak complied with the
DMA’s notice requirements. In so doing, the Court rejected Mr. Gerrity’s
argument that a surface owner must identify all mineral interest holders and
attempt service by certified mail on each because the DMA acknowledges
that identification of all mineral interest holders may not be possible and
therefore permits notice by other means (i.e., publication). The Court
declined to adopt a bright-line rule detailing the efforts a surface owner
must expend before resorting to notice by publication, leaving the creation
of such a rule to the legislature. Nevertheless, the Court provided some
guidance by reviewing Mr. Chervenak’s notice efforts. Prior to resorting to
service by publication, Mr. Chervenak searched the records of Guernsey
County where the property was located and learned that the mineral interest
holder of record had a Cleveland address. Mr. Chervenak then searched in
the Cuyahoga County Recorder’s Office and Probate Court for records that
would establish a more recent address or heirship information. Having
found none, he mailed notice to the Cleveland address, which was returned
undelivered. The Court concluded that those efforts were reasonably
14. Gerrity v. Chervenak, 166 N.E.3d 1230 (Ohio 2020).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss2/18

2021]

Ohio

401

diligent, and that Mr. Chervenak properly resorted to service by
publication. The Court also concluded that, under the circumstances, Mr.
Chervenak was not required to perform an online search.
In conclusion, the Court held that a “[r]eview of public-property and
court records in the county where the land subject to a severed mineral
interest is located will generally establish a baseline of reasonable diligence
in identifying the holder or holders of the severed mineral interest.” The
Court emphasized, however, that whether additional efforts are necessary
“will depend on the circumstances of each case.”
4. State ex rel. Omni Energy Group v. ODNR
In State ex rel. Omni Energy Group, L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Natural
Resources, Div. of Oil & Gas Resources Mgt.,15 December 9, 2020, the
Ohio Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus sought by Omni Energy
Group, LLC (“Omni”) to discuss the validity of objections that were
submitted concerning Omni's two saltwater injection well permit
applications. The Court held that Omni was not only entitled to the writ, but
also determined that the division chief of the Ohio Department of Natural
Resources, Division of Oil and Gas Resources Management (“ODNR”)
does not have the legal authority to insist on a delay for a public meeting.
This case was brought to the Court to compel the division chief to either
issue or deny their saltwater injection well permit applications. 16 Omni filed
applications in March 2019 and, after the requisite period of notice and
comment, the ODNR received around 100 comments objecting to the
placement of the injection wells.17 The division chief planned to hold an in
person meeting concerning the applications; however, the meeting was
changed to an online format due to COVID-19 restrictions. This change
caused Murray Energy Corporation to file suit and seek temporary
injunction against the use of an online forum, preferring the public meeting
to be held in person. 18
In their opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus,
but instead of ordering the ODNR to promptly render a decision on the
applications, the Court instead ruled upon the validity of the objections as
required under Ohio Adm. Code 1501:9-3-06(H)(2)(c). The Court held that
(1) the division chief does not possess legal authority to delay the
15. State ex rel. Omni Energy Grp., L.L.C. v. Ohio Dept. of Nat. Res., Div. of Oil and
Gas Res. Mgt.., 2020-Ohio-5581.
16. State ex rel. Omni Energy Group, L.L.C., 2020 -Ohio- 5581 at ¶ 1.
17. Id.
18. Id. at ¶ 6.
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application process for a public meeting, as the statute requires specific
time periods to be met (2) Omni had a clear legal right to a ruling on the
validity of objections submitted against the applications; as mandated in the
Administrative Code, and (3) there is a legal duty to determine if the
objections received cross the code’s threshold to require a hearing. 19 As
such, the court then established that the next step in issuing or denying the
permits is to analyze the objections received before determining whether a
hearing is needed.
5. Suspension of Injection Wells
In State ex rel. AWMS Water Sols., L.L.C. v. Mertz,20 the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals granting summary judgment
for the State and concluding that the claim was not unripe and summary
judgment based on a takings claim was inappropriate because fact questions
existed as to whether regulation was temporary, partial, or deprived the
claimant of all economically beneficial use of the land.
This case arises from AWMS Water Solutions (“AWMS”) application to
the Ohio Department of Natural Resources Division of Oil and Gas
Resources Management (“ODNR”) for permits to construct and operate
saltwater injection wells on 5.2 acres of industrial property. Shortly after
being approved, earthquakes occurred near saltwater injection wells in
Youngstown, Ohio. After AWMS filed their application to ODNR, the
Ohio Governor allowed the ODNR to study and impose rules surrounding
earthquakes triggered by the wells. 21 Subsequently, operations of the one
well (“Well #2”) was subsequently suspended based on concerns of
triggering recent earthquakes. 22 Multiple appeals followed, but ODNR
rejected all arguments, continually citing the possible, imminent danger
posed by the operation of the well.23
AWMS argued that it suffered a constitutional taking of its property
when the ODNR suspended the operation of Well #2. In opposition, the
State argued that AWMS had not been deprived benefit from their property,
as they still had another operating well on the property (“Well #1). The
Ohio Supreme Court concluded that genuine issues of material fact
precluded summary judgment. The court analyzed the partial takings claim
under the Penn Central factors as to the economic impact on AWMS for
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at ¶¶ 19-24.
.165 N.E.3d 1167 (Ohio 2020).
.165 N.E.3d at 1173.
.Id. at 1174.
.Id. at 1175.
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suspending operation of Well #2. The Court heard experts from both
AWMS and the State, who offered distinctly different, but equally wellreasoned, calculations in estimating the economic impact.24 An AWMS
expert estimated that the suspension resulted in over a 100% loss for
investors in the company; however, the State's expert's estimate of loss was
significantly lower. Thus, the Court found a clear dispute of fact regarding
the economic impact of the Well #2’s suspension and remanded to the
Eleventh District.
B. District Court Cases
1. Production of “Paying Quantities”
In Browne v. Artex Oil Co.,25 the Fifth District Court of Appeals of Ohio
issued its opinion wherein it held that the oil and gas lease in question was
held by “production in paying quantities” based on personal testimony from
certain individuals who claimed that there was never a period of two or
more years that the well was not pumped or produced. As such, the
Appellees produced evidence sufficient to establish the absence of any
genuine issue of material fact regarding production in paying quantities.
This case involved a 1975 oil and gas lease with a primary term of one
year and a habendum clause extending the primary term for as “long
thereafter as oil and gas, or either of them, is produced by lessee from said
land or from a communized unit as hereinafter provided.” The court of
appeals concluded that the lessees had produced sufficient evidence of
production of oil in “paying quantities” based on numerous affidavits from
the owners of the Well, who testified that oil was sold consistently and that
real estate taxes were assessed for the well during the relevant period. 26 The
lessors asserted several arguments to the contrary, none of which the court
found persuasive. First, the lessors argued the Ohio Department of Natural
Resources (“ODNR”) completions report showed a gap in reported
production. The court noted the failure to file production reports with the
ODNR does not demonstrate that oil was not in fact produced. Moreover,
the ODNR reports did not show zero production. Second, the lessors
pointed to a “Chief’s Order” from the ODNR that required operations to be
suspended due to the operator’s failure to provide ODNR with its insurance
policy and production reports for 1993. The court again reasoned that the
order did not establish that production in fact ceased, only that it was
24. Id. at 1184-85.
25. .Browne v. Artex Oil Co., 2021-Ohio-2239 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist., 2021)..
26. .2021-Ohio-2239 at ¶¶ 58-59.
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ordered to cease. Third, the lessors argued that probate documents from the
well operator’s wife showed there was no production because there was no
royalty income listed for 1993 or 1994.27 However, the court noted that the
wife never owned the well, as the operator had left the well to his
grandchildren. Finally, the lessors argued the county auditor’s records
showed lack of production from 1997 to 1999, but the court stated the
information in the records was “inconsistent and ambiguous” as it listed the
well as “producing” but showed no average daily or total production.
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment to the lessees and denial of summary judgment to the lessors.
This case is notable as it provides an example wherein the courts looked to
verbal testimony rather than written documentation from the typically
reviewed sources regarding production in paying quantities.
2. MTA Application to Severed Mineral Rights
In McCombs v. Dennis28, the Fifth District Court of Appeals discussed
the application of the Ohio Marketable Title Act (“MTA”) and the Ohio
Dormant Mineral Act (DMA). In this case, the court determined that the
MTA not only applies to any severed mineral interest, but it also is not the
exclusive method for reuniting severed minerals with surface rights.
In McCombs the Patterson’s conveyed 122 acres and reserved “all of the
oil and gas.”29 After the surface changed ownership multiple times, Charles
McCombs became the owner. David McCombs sought extinguishment of
the previously severed mineral interest and filed a complaint to quiet title to
92 acres of the property in November 2019. 30 The Patterson heirs first
argued that the MTA applies only to royalty interests and not severed
mineral interests like the Patterson reservation. The court of appeals
rejected that contention, explaining that the MTA did not limit its
application to royalty interests and that the state supreme court had recently
applied the MTA to several mineral interests without making any
distinction between the two types of interests. The Patterson heirs also
claimed that, based on the court’s prior decisions in Straits and Hefner,
McCombs could not rely on the MTA because neither his “deed nor his
chain of title purports to convey the mineral rights to him.” The court also
rejected this, explaining that the decisions on which the Patterson heirs
relied pre-dated Blackstone and that its later decisions “have effectively
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at ¶¶ 40-60.
2021-Ohio-1181 (Ohio Ct. App., 5th Dist., 2021).
2021-Ohio-1181 at ¶2.
Id. at ¶5.
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overruled Straits and Hefner.” Finally, the Patterson heirs contended that
the MTA was inapplicable, as the DMA “is the exclusive method for
reuniting severed minerals with the surface rights.” The court dispatched
that claim by explaining that the state supreme court had recently held
“both the MTA and the DMA are to be given full force and effect with
regards to severed mineral interest.”
3. “Other minerals” language in Ohio deeds include oil and gas
In O’Kelley v. Rothenbuhler,31 the Seventh District Court of Appeals
issued its opinion discussing the specificity necessary to preserve a mineral
interest under the Marketable Title Act (“MTA”). In its holding, it
determined that the language of a 1969 deed reference “and also excepting
the oil and gas minerals…” was not sufficiently specific to save a severed
mineral interest from extinguishment under Ohio’s MTA, R.C. 5301.47 et
seq.
In O’Kelley, in 1893, William Morris conveyed a 160-acre parcel of
property to Mary Zonker. In that deed, Morris reserved “all oil, gas and
minerals (including coal) of whatsoever kinds with full right to develop
same and to operate on said premises therefore with the incidental rights
and privileges necessary to such development and operation including
among other things the right to locate and drill thereon and therein oil wells
and gas wells to lay pipes to and from said wells.” The property was the
subject of several conveyances before coming into the surface owners’
possession.
On August 9, 2019, Robert O’Kelley filed a complaint to quiet the title
and claimed ownership based on the Morris reservation. The property was
the subject of several conveyances including a 1969 deed (“Rothenbuhler
Deed”) that referenced the previous reservation as “also excepting the oil
and gas minerals including coal underlying the same heretofore
conveyed.”32 For purposes of the MTA analysis, the root of title was the
Rothenbuhler Deed from 1969, the most recent transfer filed prior to the
40-year look-back provision. The surface owners moved for summary
judgement, arguing that the MTA extinguished the Morris reservation based
31. O'Kelley v. Rothenbuhler, reconsideration overruled sub nom. DR. ROBERT LEON
O'KELLEY, JR., Pl.-Appellant, v. RONALD ROTHENBHULER ET AL., DefendantsAppellees. Additional Party Names: Constance Smith, Jason Lumbatis, Jennifer
Rothenbuhler, Kenneth Rothenbuhler, Kevin Rothenbuhler, Kristy Rothenbuhler Lumbatis,
Randy Smith, Rothenbuhler Oil and Gas, LLC, Sharon Rothenbuhler, SWN Prod. (Ohio),
LLC, 2021-Ohio-2488
32. 2021-Ohio-1167 at ¶8.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

406

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

on the 1969 Rothenbuhler Deed general reference to “also excepting the oil
and gas minerals including coal underlying the same heretofore
conveyed.”33 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
surface owners, holding that the Rothenbuhler Deed reservation was not
specific and, thus, the mineral interest reserved in the 1893 deed was
extinguished under the MTA.
The Seventh District subsequently agreed. However, the court concluded
that the references were “general references,” because of the lack of “any
narrow precise considerations, limited details, or particulars as described in
Blackstone.”34 Unlike Blackstone and the recent Ohio Supreme Court
Erickson v. Morrison, reference was not a “verbatim restatement” repeated
from the original and subsequent deed transfers. Not only did the
Rothenbuhler Deed lack similar language to the original deed from 1893,
but the Rothenbuhler Deed also omitted the specified rights Morris
originally reserved in the 1893 deed. The reference within the Rothenbuhler
deed was mere “boilerplate language” that failed to reserve “specific,
identifiable reservation of mineral rights.”35 Thus, it lacked sufficient
specificity and the court concluded the Rothenbuhler Deed could not have
saved a severed mineral interest from extinguishment under Ohio’s MTA.
4. “Other minerals” language in Ohio deeds include oil and gas
In O’Brandovich v. Hess Ohio Developments LLC,36 the Seventh District
Court of Appeals again interpreted instances in which a reservation or
conveyance of “coal and other minerals” would include oil and gas interest
rights. The court concluded that the language of “coal and other minerals”
does include oil and gas, because by 1940 oil and gas extraction was
“common place” and presumed to include oil and gas rights unless
expressly written otherwise.
In the case, the court determined whether the term “other minerals”
would include oil and gas when a 1940 deed reservation primarily
referenced coal extraction. The court analyzed previous cases interpreting
similar language, such as Detlor v. Holland37 and Gordon v. Carter Oil
Co.,38 both of which found that “other minerals” did not include oil and gas.
However, when these cases were decided, the court reasoned that oil and
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at ¶30.
Id. at ¶44 (internal quotes omitted).
Id.
O'Brandovich v. Hess Ohio Devs., LLC, 2021-Ohio-1287
57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N.E. 690 (1898).
19 Ohio App. 319, 3 Ohio Law Abs. 43 (5th Dist.1924).
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gas production were not a regular occurrence during the times the deeds
were executed (1890 and 1902, respectively). 39 It was not until a couple of
decades later where oil and gas production and reservations were routine.
Thus, by the time the deed in this case was executed, 1940, oil and gas
production was commonplace and presumed in the deed’s language. Unless
the deed expressed otherwise, “other minerals” would include oil and gas
interests. Upon specific review of the 1940 deed at issue, the court believed
that although the easement language primarily focused on the reservation of
coal extraction,40 it also discussed the mineral owner’s right “to use, occupy
and possess any of the surface of the above-described premises necessary,
convenient or required for the exploring, drilling, testing, mining and
removal of said coal or other minerals.” 41 This language, as explained by
the court, was not inconsistent with the development of oil and gas on the
property and did not counter the presumption. 42 Furthermore, the deed’s
inclusion of the word “drilling” was relevant and consistent with multiple
other minerals, such as oil and gas development.43 Thus, the court
concluded that the language of “coal and other minerals” does include oil
and gas and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal.
5. Adverse Possession of Mineral Rights Through Shallow Drilling
In Tomechko v. Garrett,44 the Seventh District Court of Appeals
discussed mineral right reservations and adverse possession of mineral
rights. The court held that adverse possession of shallow oil and gas will
also constitute adverse possession of deep oil and gas on a parcel if the
shallow production “modified the subterranean structure” of the estate.
The court analyzed a case that contained a similar issue, Diederick v.
Ware45. In Diederick, the Kentucky court held that producing wells on a
parcel of land met the requirements for adverse possession where it
“modified the subterranean structure under the large tract of land.” 46 The
Diederick court found that land alteration and permeation of oil and gas
caused by the withdrawal of oil and gas by drilling, would constitute

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

O'Brandovich, 2021-Ohio-1287 at ¶23.
Id. at ¶29.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶30.
2021-Ohio-1377 (Ohio Ct. App., 7th Dist., 2021)..
288 S.W.2d 643, (C.A. Ky. 1956),
Tomechko, ¶ 56 (internal citations omitted).
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constructive possession of the estate. 47 Thus, if the shallow production of
oil and gas “modified the subterranean structure,” there would be adverse
possession of both the deep and shallow interest. The court concluded that
the operation of oil wells on the tract modified the subterranean structure
under the land. 48
On review of the case before them, the Court analyzed the facts
supporting the adverse possession claim (i.e., leasing oil and gas rights,
drilling under the lease, receiving all royalties, and doing so for more than
twenty years) and determined that “these facts sufficiently establish overt
acts of unequivocal character asserting ownership” by the Tomechkos. 49 It
then concluded that “adverse possession of the deep rights should follow
the shallow rights due to the alteration of the surface and subsurface from
drilling and removing the oil and gas.”50 Accordingly, the court of appeals
reversed and modified the trial court’s ruling on the adverse possession
issue “to also include adverse possession of the deep rights” by the
Tomechkos.51
6. Title Transaction Location of Filing
In Lucas v. Whyte,52 the Seventh District Court of Appeals discussed the
requirements of the MTA, whether the probate filings in a county other than
where the property is located would be able to save an oil and gas
reservation from extinguishment, whether a title transaction that takes place
outside of the 40 year look back period of the MTA satisfies a title
transaction, and the proper procedure for providing notice under the
ODMA.
In 1914, John and Sarah Miller conveyed 25 acres of property in Monroe
County to John McCoy, but reserved half of the oil and gas and all of the
coal underlying the property (the “Miller Reservation”). 53 When John
Miller died intestate in 1940, the Belmont County Probate Court sent the
Monroe County Reporter a certificate of transfer that indicated his interest
in the Miller Reservation. Upon the deaths of several of these predecessors,
their estates were administered in Belmont County and purported to convey
their interests in 1986, 1989, and 1999 as evidenced by Belmont Count’s
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

2021-Ohio-1377 at ¶56.
Id.
Id. at ¶52.
Id. at ¶53.
Id. at ¶59.
.Lucas v. Whyte, 2021-Ohio-222, 167 N.E.3d 40.
Lucas, 167 N.E.3d at 42
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public records.54 Subsequently, in 2017 two heirs of the original reservation
entered into oil and gas leases. Finally, the current surface owner did not
attempt to serve notice via certified mail. Instead the owner opted to publish
the notice in the Monroe County Beacon, a newspaper of general
circulation in Monroe County.
Focusing on the language in R.C. 5301.47(D), which establishes the
“title transaction” exception to extinguishment, the court majority rejected
the argument that a title transaction filed in another county’s probate court
and held that it “must be recorded in the county where the real property is
located, in order for the R.C. 5301.49(D) exception to apply.”55. The court
further stipulated that an examiner should only have to look at the county
records where the property sits, not outside of it.
The Court then looked to the oil and gas leases entered into by heirs in
title of the original reservation. The Court reasoned that although an oil and
gas lease would constitute a title transaction and effectually “save” the
severed mineral interest, in this case, the oil and gas leases were entered
into 51 years after the root of title, which is outside of the 40 year look back
period and thus does not constitute a savings event.
Finally, the court determined that if a surface owner conducts a
reasonable search for a severed mineral interest owner and is not successful,
then publication in a newspaper of general circulation is sufficient to
provide proper notice. However, because the court found the mineral
interest extinguished under the MTA, it did not expand upon this argument.
The court concluded that probate filings outside the county where the
property is located would not save an oil and gas reservation from
extinguishment. Furthermore, the court determined that although a lease
may satisfy a title transaction, if it is outside the 40 year look back period, it
does not satisfy the MTA exception.
7. Residuary clause as a savings event
In Hartline v. Atkinson,56 the Seventh District Court of Appeals
discussed the application of the DMA to determine whether interest passing
under the residuary clause of a last will and testament qualifies as a title
transaction under the MTA. The court ultimately held that an interest
passing under through a Last Will and Testament qualifies as a title
54. Id. at 46.
55. Id. at 48.
56. Hartline v. Atkinson, 2020-Ohio-5606, reconsideration denied, 2021-Ohio-575,
appeal allowed, 168 N.E.3d 1208 (Ohio 2021).
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transaction under the MTA if, pursuant to R.C. 5301.47(B) and (C), it is
filed in the probate court.
On appeal to the Seventh District, the Hartlines argued that the trial court
erred in granting summary judgement to the Webbs, arguing that the MTA
did extinguish a portion of the severed mineral interest because there was
an unbroken chain of title filed in the Monroe County Recorder’s Office. 57
The Hartline’s argued that Webb’s Last Will and Testament devised all
property to his wife, Belle Webb, but it did not affect the title because the
Will failed to identify the Webb Interest. However, the court rejected this
argument and relied on its previous holding in Warner v. Palmer. In
Warner, the court held that “Recording, in the context of R.C. 5301.49(D),
includes filing in the probate court.”58 In other words, a Last Will and
Testament filed in probate court would suffice as “recording” under the
MTA. Ultimately, the court acknowledged that although the interest at issue
is not specifically listed in the will or probate proceedings, Webb’s will was
a title transaction59. Consequently, the Court held a last will and testament
filed in the probate records of the county where the interest is located
within forty years of the root of title is a recorded title transaction under
R.C. 5301.49(D).
V. Conclusion
As evidenced by the various cases listed above, Ohio courts continue to
adjudicate numerous oil and gas issues, and it would be reasonable to
expect further significant rulings from the Supreme Court of Ohio and the
lower courts over the next few years.

57. Atkinson, 168 N.E.3d at ¶18.
58. Id.: citing R.C. 5301.47(B), (C).
59. Id. at ¶29.
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